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THE CONTRACT CLAUSE: THE USE OF
A STRICT STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR
STATE LEGISLATION THAT
IMPAIRS PRIVATE CONTRACTS-
ALLIED STRUCTURAL STEEL CO. V. SPANNAUS
A potential conflict of interests arises whenever a state enacts social or
economic legislation that impairs an existing contractual obligation. This con-
flict is the result of a confrontation between two seemingly irreconcilable
constitutional doctrines. The first is the police power of the state, under the
tenth amendment, to enact legislation for the protection of the health, mor-
als and welfare of its citizens.1  The second is the restriction of that power
under the contract clause to enact legislation that impairs contractual obliga-
tions. 2 When such a confrontation occurs, the relative importance of each
interest must be balanced to determine which is paramount. In Allied Struc-
tural Steel Co. v. Spannaus,3 the United States Supreme Court recently
upheld the tenents of the contract clause when it invalidated a Minnesota
statute pertaining to pension reform 4 because it impaired the contractual
obligations between Allied Structural Steel Company and its employees.5
While this decision reaffirmed the viability of the contract clause and gave
greater protection to individual contractual rights, it seemingly denied the
states the power to enact legislation which thev deem essential for the pro-
tection of their citizens' welfare.
The purpose of this Note is to examine the Court's recent holding in Al-
lied. To effectuate this analysis, the Note will give a brief survey of prior
contract clause case law. It will further present the possible impact of the
decision on future social and economic legislation. Finally, it will argue that
1. When the nation was united, the existing states were apprehensive about losing their
control and power. A division of power was established between the Federal and State govern-
ments and the 10th amendment guaranteed: "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively
.U. S. CONST. amend. X.
2. This restriction is set out in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, which states:
No state shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance or Confederation; grant Letters of
Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any thing but gold
and silver coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post
facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or Grant any Title of
Nobility.
Id. (emphasis added).
3. 98 S.Ct. 2716 (1978).
4. Minnesota Private Pension Benefits Protection Act, MINN. STAT. §§ 181B.01-181B.17
(1974).
5. 98 S.Ct. at 2726.
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pension reform legislation benefits the general welfare and that a state,
therefore, should be permitted, on the strength of its police power, to impair
the obligations of contracts in this area.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
To comprehend the current viability of the contract clause and the deci-
sion reached in Allied, it is necessary to examine the historical development
of the clause. 6 The clause and the other restrictions found in the tenth
section of Article I7 were the result of the Framers' concern over specific
abuses of state power.8 One such abuse arose after the Revolutionary War,
when states began to pass laws in favor of debtors. These laws permitted the
liquidation of debts by the tendering of depreciated money or worthless
property, 9 which in turn had the detrimental effect of undermining trade
and destroying credit of an economy already shaken by war.10 The contract
clause was adopted to restrict such legislation and to protect the contractual
rights of creditors."
6. The contract clause has been the subject of many commentaries which discuss its de-
velopment in greater depth than possible in this Note. See generally B. WRIGHT, THE CON-
TRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION (1938) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT]; Hale, The Su-
preme Court and the Contract Clause, 57 HARV. L. REV. (pts. 1-3) 512, 621, 852 (1944)
[hereinafter cited as Hale]. Note, The Continuing Vitality of the Contract Clause of the Federal
Constitution, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 576 (1967).
7. See note 2 supra.
8. Unlike the fifth amendment which restricts the federal government's power to deprive
a person of his property, the Framers did not make Art. I Section 10 a direct ban on the State's
ability to deprive citizens of their property. It was not until ratification of the fourteenth
amendment that the states were so restricted. It should also be noted that Art. I, § 10 applies
to states only. The federal government may impair contractual obligations if no fifth amendment
prohibitions are violated by the legislation. See Hale, supra note 6, at 512-13.
9. Hale, supra note 6, at 512.
10. Justice Marshall, in his dissent in Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827),
wrote that the economic troubles plaguing the country were "mischief" which had "become so
alarming" that it was not only hurting commerce but "destroying the sanctity of private faith."
Id. at 355. See also Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 428 (1934).
11. The contract clause, although "short and simple" has been proven to be "vast of comprehension
and meaning." D. WATSON, THE CONSTrru'TON OF THE UNITED STATES 778-80 (1910). There
are differing accounts concerning the actual insertion of the contract clause into the Constitu-
tion. It has been suggested that the clause was passed because the Framers, who were wealthy
men and oftentimes creditors, feared that legislation relieving debtors would hurt their financial
status. See Note, The Continuing Vitality of the Contract Clause of the Federal Constitution,
40 S. CAL. L. REV. 576, 576 (1967). Furthermore, the clause received very little attention in
state conventions when the adoption of the Constitution was debated. It has been generally
agreed, however, that the clause was adopted to protect the individual from state interference.
This is reflected by Justice Black's discussion of the contract clause in his dissent in City of El
Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965). He noted "that men should not have to act at their
peril, fearing always that the state might change its mind and alter the legal consequences of
their past acts so as to take away their lives, their liberty or their property." Id. at 522.
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Although originally established to restrict legislation which relieved debt-
ors, the clause was expanded by the Court to apply to other types of con-
tractual obligations, 12 such as public land grants 13 and corporate charters.
14
However, the early history became less significant as the Court began to
recognize limitations on the scope of contract clause protections.
The earliest restrictions occurred when the Court refused to extend the
protection of contractual obligations to prospective or future contracts. 15
Another restriction resulted when the Court made a distinction between the
obligation of a contract and the remedies pertaining to its enforcement.' 6
The impact of this distinction was that the Court found that statutory modifi-
cations of contractual remedies did not necessarily impair the obligation of
contracts and therefore, were deemed valid exercises of state power.' 7
12. The early expansion of the clause is attributed to Justice Marshall. Marshall was a
nationalist who regarded the contract clause as an opportunity to protect property rights from
state interference. Beginning with Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810), he turned
the contract clause into a powerful instrument for the protection of private property. He con-
tinued his expansion of the clause until the Court refused to follow him in Ogden v. Saunders,
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827), see note 15 and accompanying text, infra. In that case, the
majority thought Marshall overextended his theory when he tried to expand the clause's protec-
tion of contractual rights to contracts to be made in the future. WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 28.
Wright also gives an extensive discussion of the clause's expansion. Id. at 27-88. See also C.
ANTIEAU, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I 247 (1969); M. SHAPIRO & R. TRESOLINI, AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 218-20 (4th ed. 1975).
13. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). In Fletcher, the Court expanded the
applicability of the clause from private contracts made between two individuals to public con-
tracts or those made between an individual and a State. The Supreme Court found a legislative
repeal of a state land grant which had been obtained through corrupt political channels to be
invalid. This conclusion was reached because the land grant was construed to be a contract;
therefore, a repeal would constitute an impairment of contractual obligations.
14. In Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819), the Court further
extended the applicability of the clause to corporate charters when it decided that a state could
not interfere with charters made between a corporation and a state. The Supreme Court held
that a charter was a contract, therefore, subsequent legislation altering its terms was an uncon-
stitutional impairment of obligation. It should be noted that the protection granted to corporate
charters was short lived because the states adopted reserve clauses in their constitutions which
gave the states the right to amend or repeal charters of incorporation. WRIGHT, supra note 6, at
60.
15. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827). It was assumed by the Court that
all contracts incorporate existing law. Therefore, any law enacted before a contract is made is
impliedly considered part of the contract. Id. at 260. See also note 12 supra.
16. See, Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 200 (1819).
17. Cases which make a distinction between modification of remedy and obligation of con-
tract include: Honeyman v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 539, 542 (1939) (the requirement that a deficiency
judgment be determined in a foreclosure suit was not found to be an impairment of contractual
obligation); Antoni v. Creenhow, 107 U.S. 769, 775 (1882) (after coupons which were made
receivable as payment of taxes were issued, a law was passed that required the holders of the
coupons to pay for their taxes first in legal tender and then, after the validity of the coupons had
been established, they would be honored; this was found to be a change in remedy and not an
impairment of contract.); Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535, 553-54 (1866)
(imprisonment for a debt was not found to be part of a contract, therefore, a state could abolish
a sentence without impairing the obligation of the contract); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S.
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With the advent of due process, the Court's use of the contract clause to
prevent state interference with contractual rights declined significantly.' 8
The due process clause was favored because it had a broader scope of ap-
plication. The versatile scope of the due process clause was attributed to
the fact that it was not circumscribed by the precedent, such as the remedy
versus obligation distinction, that restricted the scope of contract clause ap-
plication. 19 As contracts were considered to be a form of property, the
Court was more inclined to use the broader due process clause, thus rel-
egating the contract clause to a position of a "mere technical provision."2 0
The most important limitation of the contract clause was the recognition
by the Supreme Court, of the conflicting interest of state power, specifically
the "inalienable"'2 police power.2 2  The police power is the regulatory con-
trol employed by the state to protect the general welfare of its citizens.2 3
The Court had recognized the vitality of the police power by denying indi-
viduals the ability to use the contract clause as a shield against statutes
passed for the common good.2 4  Furthermore, it often gave deference to the
state legislature's judgment of public needs. 25  This deferral, however, was
(4 Wheat.) 122, 200 (1819) (imprisonment for a debt could be abolished without violating the
contract's terms because imprisonment, though a remedy, was not found to be part of the
contract. Therefore, to release a prisoner was not an impairment of a contractual obligation.).
18. See WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 258.
19. Id. See also M. SHAPIRO & R. TRESOLINI, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 218-20
(4th ed. 1975).
20. WRICHT, supra note 6, at 258. Another commentator has suggested that "the results
might be the same if the contract clause were dropped out of the Constitution, and the chal-
lenged statutes all judged as reasonable or unreasonable deprivations of property." Hale, supra
note 6, at 890-91.
21. The police power is considered to be essential to a state's existence and cannot be
contracted away. See Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1879), where the Court stated: "the
legislature cannot bargain away the police power of a state." Id. at 817. See also U.S. Trust Co.
v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 21 (1977); Home Bldg. & Loan Assn v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398,
434-40 (1934).
22. See C. ANTIEAU, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 250 (1969); W. WILLOUGHBY, THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 1231-32 (1929).
23. See T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 574 (8th ed.
1927).
24. In Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908), the Court prevented a
contract between two riparian owners from invalidating state legislation that prohibited the di-
version of an important stream to another state for use therein. In so doing, the Court stated,
"[olne whose rights; such as they are, are subject to state restriction, cannot remove them from
the power of the State by making a contract about them." Id. at 357. See also Home Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 420 (1934).
25. See Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473 (1905), in which the court recognized that the police
power "is an exercise of the sovereign right of the Government to protect the ... general
welfare of the people, and is paramount to any rights under contract between individuals." Id.
at 480. Furthermore, justification for this deference is due to the Court's belief that a state
legislature "being familiar with local conditions, is, primarily, the judge of the necessity of such
enactments." Chicago, Burlington & Quincy HR. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 569 (1911) quoting
McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539, 547 (1909). See also Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726
(1963).
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not total-since the Court did consider the compelling purpose behind the
clause-the protection of an individual's contractual rights. Therefore, a
balancing test was employed in each case to determine which interest was
paramount.26 The potency of the police power, though, was such that legis-
lation designed to ensure health, 27 morals 28 and welfare 29 was frequently
upheld.
In the leading modern case, Home Savings & Loan Association v. Blais-
dell,30 the Court made an extensive review of previous contract clause case
law 31 and, in recognizing the importance of state police power, sustained
the Minnesota Moratorium law. 3 2  In so doing, the Court balanced the two
competing interests to determine if they existed in "harmony with each
other." 33  The decision established the general rule that an exercise of
police power could be sustained, despite possible impairment of contractual
26. See, Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535, 554 (1866).
27. See, e.g., Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548 (1914) (legislation
regulating safety precautions was upheld despite a contract between the railroad and the town
for the use of the land); Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908) (legisla-
tion forbidding the diversion of the flow of a major stream was upheld although individual
contracts existed permitting such action); Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473 (1905) (legislation
permitted the building of a dam despite contracts forbidding such action); Butcher's Union Co.
v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746 (1884) (legislation prohibiting butchering, receiving and
landing livestock within tle city limits of New Orleans was upheld despite the impairment of
existing contracts for such business); Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1878) (legisla-
tion prohibiting the manufacturing of fertilizer from dead animals within city limits was upheld).
28. Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1879) (legislation that prohibited the operation of a
lottery despite an existing contract for such action, was found to be valid); Beer Co. v. Mas-
sachusetts, 97 U.S. 25 (1877) (state control of liquor permitted despite appellants' contract to
manufacture beer).
29. See, e.g., Pierce Oil Corp. v. City of Hope, 248 U.S. 498 (1919) (city ordinance forbid-
ding tle storage of oil within 300 feet of any dwelling did not impair the obligations of any
contracts); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (upheld a state law that ordered the
removal of a brick kiln from a residential area despite a contract to use the land); Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549 (1911) (the Court found the state legislative
power to regulate railroad benefit plans a reasonable exercise of police power despite existing
contracts releasing the railroad from liability).
30. 290 U.S. 398 (1934). This case debated the validity of the Minnesota Moratorium Law
passed in 1933. The Law, enacted during the Depression, provided a temporary extension of
mortgage redemption periods. During the time granted, the mortgagee retained possession of
the land and was required to apply a reasonable rental value to the mortgage. The appellant
claimed the law impaired the obligation of its contract with the appellee by granting such an
extension of time for redemption.
31. Id. at 427-42.
32. Chief Justice Hughes, writing for the majority, said, "the State also continues to possess
authority to safeguard the vital interests of its people." Id. at 434.
33. Id. at 427-,40. The Court stated:
Undoubtedly, whatever is reserved of state power must be consistent with the fair
intent of the constitutional limitation of that power. The reserved power cannot be
construed so as to destroy the limitation, nor is the limitation to be construed to
destroy the reserved power in its essential aspects. They must be construed in
harmony with each other.
Id. at 439.
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obligations, only if "legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and the mea-
sures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end." 34  The majority
determined that the state legislation at issue was reasonable because it was
enacted for an emergency situation, addressed a legitimate societal interest,
was tailored to the emergency, and was limited to the duration of that
emergency while the conditions imposed were reasonable. 35 Thus, the im-
pact of the Blaisdell decision was to establish a new standard for the review
of contract clause cases which provided that legislation in this area was con-
stitutionally valid only if it had a legitimate goal and reasonable means.
Blaisdell, however, did not guarantee protection to all state legislation that
impaired contractual obligations. Instead, subsequent decisions found state
legislation which impaired contracts unconstitutional because the state in-
terest in the controversial statute was not sufficient to outweigh the constitu-
tional restrictions of the contract clause. 36 The Court, in reaching its con-
clusions, relied on the newly established standards of Blaisdell to balance the
reasonableness of the disputed legislation against the contract clause. In its
application of these standards, however, the Court did not judge the legisla-
tion at issue by examining it for all possible legitimate goals, but rather a
specific test developed for another set of circumstances was applied. Legisla-
tion was, therefore, found unconstitutional when there was no evident
emergency 37 or the legislation was not temporary in nature. 38
Although the cases immediately following Blaisdell have never been over-
ruled, they have been modified. The Court began to relax its strict applica-
tion of the Blaisdell standards by examining the legislation at issue
for reasonable means used to implement a goal deemed to be legitimate. 39
For example, in City of El Paso v. Simmons,4 0 the majority held that "not
every modification of a contractual promise impairs the obligation of a con-
tract under federal law."''" El Paso involved a Texas statute that limited
34. Id. at 438 (emphasis added).
35. id. at 444-47.
36. See, e.g., Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426 (1934). In Worthen, appellant had
obtained a writ of garnishment on appellee's life insurance policy. The Arkansas legislature
subsequently passed a law exempting such policies from garnishment. When appellant's writ of
garnishment was dismissed, he claimed impairment of his contractual obligation. The Court,
upon its review of the case, found the Arkansas legislation invalid under the contract clause
because it was neither temporary nor conditioned upon the existence of an emergency. Id. at
433-34.
37. id.
38. Again, in Triegle v. Acme Homestead Ass'n, 297 U.S. 189 (1936), the Court struck
down legislation that regulated the right to withdraw funds from saving and loan associations
because it impaired individuals' contract rights. Although adopted to protect the solvency of
such associations and ergo the economy, the Court found the legislation unconstitutional. Once
again the Court using the Blaisdell guidelines found state legislation not reasonably adapted to
its goals because it did "not purport to deal with any existing emergency and the provisions are
neither temporary nor conditional." id. at 195.
39. See note 34 supra.
40. 379 U.S. 497 (1965).
41. Id. at 506-07.
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previously unrestricted reinstatement rights of a defaulting land purchaser. A
statute had been passed which provided that the State Land Board could sell
a person's land who had failed to make the interest payments on the prop-
erty. The defaulting party could buy the land back by paying the full
amount owed to the Treasury. At the time, there were no time limits estab-
lished to restrict the redemption of the land. Years later, an amendment to
the statute established such a limitation. The appellee was not allowed to
redeem his land because of the amendment and therefore, claimed an im-
pairment of his original contract. Despite this claim and the lack of an appar-
ent emergency, the majority upheld the legislation because it benefitted the
public interest by effectively utilizing the land to provide revenue for the
public school system.' The Court, however, did remark that the promise
which was impaired was not a central undertaking of the contract.4 2  This
case was important to the development of the contract clause because the
Court once again recognized the inherent value of state legislation designed
for the general welfare. In addition, the debated legislation was not analyzed
in terms of previously established standards,4 3 but was examined for the
existence of a legitimate goal and reasonable means to reach that goal as
directed by the Blaisdell decision.
In United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey,4 4 the most recent contract
clause case decided prior to Allied, the Court recognized the importance of
42. Id. at 514.
43. The Supreme Court, in Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32 (1940),
rejected the requirement that an emergency situation exist to justify state legislation that im-
pairs the obligations of contracts. In that case, legislation was passed to regulate the withdrawal
of funds from building and loan associations. The Court disregarded the need for temporary
regulation or an emergency situation and ruled that legislation deemed important enough for an
emergency can also exist on a permanent basis. Id. at 39. The majority examined the legisla-
ture's purpose for enacting the amendment and concluded: "[wjith institutions of such impor-
tance to its economy, the State retains police powers adequate to authorize the enactment of
statutes regulating the withdrawal of shares." Id. at 38.
The Court went a step further in East New York Sav. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230 (1945)
when it declared that the police power of a state may be treated as an implied term in every
contract. Id. at 232. This case involved a moratorium law enacted by the New York legislature.
In 1944, an action to foreclose property was commenced but was barred by the moratorium law.
Appellees claimed that since the law passed after the contract was made, there was an uncon-
stitutional impairment of his rights. Although this case was similar to Blaisdell in that it sus-
tained a mortgage moratorium, the Court was not concerned with the existence of an
emergency situation. Instead the majority respected the legislature's lengthy study, which led
to the enactment of the legislation. But see Worthen v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56 (1935) where
the Court found that the legislation passed to regulate the payment of assessments unconstitu-
tionally impaired contractual obligations. In this case, one reason for the decision was that the
legislation was passed "[w]ith studied indifference to the interests of the mortgagee or to his
appropriate protection. ... Id. at 60. The Hahn Court finally concluded, in recognizing a
State's power to legislate for the good of the public, that "[o]nce we are in this domain of the
reserve power of a State we must respect the 'wide descretion on the part of the legislature in
determining what is and what is not necessary."' 326 U.S. at 233, quoting Manigault v. Springs,
199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905).
44. 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
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the state's reserved powers but found the challenged legislation to be uncon-
stitutional. In this case, the state had issued bonds which contained a cove-
nant providing for the use of the funds to generate revenue for the Port
Authority. Several years after the issuance of the bonds, the state repealed
the covenant in an attempt to free the funds for use in the expansion of the
mass transit system. The bondholders subsequently brought suit to stop the
repeal claiming it impaired the obligations of their contracts in that it elimi-
nated an important security provision protecting the use of their money. The
majority, again examined the legislation for reasonable means used to im-
plement legitimate goals but employed a more in-depth standard to review
the reasonableness of the legislation. The majority focused its attention on the fact
that the state was a party to the disputed contract and concluded that courts should
not blindly defer to a state legislature where the statute benefits its financial
interest. 45  Furthermore, in examining the reasonableness of the statute, the
Court found that alternative means to accomplish the legislative goal had existed
which would not impair the contractual obligation and, therefore, it found that the
law was unnecessary. 46 The contract clause was, again, employed as an important
limitation on the reserved powers of a state. The majority, acknowledging the
importance of reserved powers and the need for a test to balance the conflicting
interests, established a need for a more stringent standard of review for state
legislation which impaired the obligations of contracts in which the state was a
party.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1963, the Allied Structural Steel Company4 7 established and became
the sole contributor to a pension fund plan.4 8  Among its provisions were
several requirements which an employee had to satisfy in order to obtain
vested pension rights.4 9  Once vested, the employee had a nonforfeitable
45. Id. at 25-26. Conversely, the Court may defer to the legislature when private contracts
are involved because the State, in enacting the statute, can be an unbiased participant. Id.
46. Id. at 29-30. The Court found alternate means, such as tax revenue, to raise the money
necessary for the expansion of the mass transit facilities.
47. Allied Structural Steel Company (hereinafter referred to as Allied Steel) was a Delaware
corporation with an office in Minnesota. Fleck v. Spannaus, 412 F. Supp. 366, 367-68 (D.
Minn. 1976).
48. Allied Steel had an unrestricted right to amend or terminate the plan and there were no
enforcement provisions to guarantee that the company made any contributions. 98 S.Ct. at
2719. Allied Steel qualified under 26 U.S.C. § 404 (1976) for a single employer plan. 98 S.Ct. at
2718. The Internal Revenue Code permitted Allied Steel to treat its contributions to the pen-
sion fund as a deduction for tax purposes. See, 26 U.S.C. § 404 (1976).
49. The requirements of the Pension Plan for vested rights were as follows:
1. An employee, aged 65, could have retired with vested rights and would have
received 1% of his/her average monthly earnings multiplied by his/her total years of
service with the company.
2. An employee, aged 60, could have retired with vested rights if he/she had
worked for the company for a minimum of 15 years.
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1979] ALLIED STRUCTURAL STEEL
right to an interest in the fund. 50  Until his rights became vested, however,
an employee could lose any interest he had accrued if he was discharged for
cause or if Allied Steel closed its offices or terminated its pension plan.
5 1
In April 1974, Minnesota passed the Private Pension Benefit Protection
Act 52 to protect the pension rights of employees working within the state.
The Act required every Minnesota company or company with a Minnesota
office having a pension plan to provide vested rights to all Minnesota
employees who had worked with the company for ten or more years. 53 The
provisions of the Act were triggered if a company closed its Minnesota office
or terminated its pension plan. In addition, a pension funding charge was
imposed on any company if its pension funds were insufficient to provide full
pensions for the employees protected by the Act. 5 4
3. An employee, who was at least 55 years of age, had vested rights if the sum of
his/her years of age plus the years of his/her service with the company equalled 75.
4. An employee, who was under the age of 55, had vested rights if the sum of
his/her age plus the years of his/her service with the company equalled 80.
Therefore, there was no minimum year requirement for obtaining vested rights in the pension
plan. Early vesting was, instead, based on the number of years an employee had worked for
Allied Steel plus his age. This meant that the only certain way to obtain vested rights was to
reach 65 before the employee's job was terminated or before Allied Steel terminated the Pen-
sion Plan. 98 S.Ct. at 2719.
50. See [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 4642; MINN. STAT. § 1818.02(12) (1974).
51. Upon termination of the Pension Plan, the assets would be distributed according to the
seniority of the employees. Distributions in this manner often resulted in excluding those
employees with little or no seniority because the company apportioned only that money cur-
rently in the fund. Allied's order of distribution was as follows:
1. To those employees who were retired and were receiving pension benefits
would go the equivalent actuarial value of their remaining pension payments.
2. To those eligible for retirement.
3. If any balance remained, to all other employees covered under the Plan.
98 S.Ct. at 2719.
52. MINN. STAT. § 181B.01-181B.17(1974) (hereinafter referred to as the "Act").
53. MINN. STAT. § 181B.03 (1974) provided:
Every employer who hereafter ceases to operate a place of employment or a pen-
sion plan within this state shall owe to his employees . . . a pension funding charge
which shall be equal to the present value of the total amount of vested pension
benefits based upon covered service . . . of such employees . . . who have com-
pleted ten or more years of any covered service under the pension plan of the
employer and whose vested pension benefits have been or will be forfeited because
of the employer's ceasing to operate a place of employment or a pension plan, less
the amount of such vested pension benefits which are compromised or settled to
the satisfaction of the commissioner . . .
MINN. STAT. § 181B.03 (1974) (emphasis added).
54. Id. "Present value of total amount of vested pension benefits" is defined by the Act as:
that sum of money which is earning interest in a secure investment from the date of
cessation of operations onward would equal the value of the vested pension benefit
on the date on which the plan participant reached normal retirement age minus that
sum of money which is set aside . . . to finance pension benefits for plan partici-
pants.
MINN. STAT. § 181B.02(16) (1974).
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Shortly thereafter, Allied Steel began to close its Minnesota operations
according to plans made prior to the passage of the Act. 55 The company
discharged eleven of its thirty Minnesota employees and since none of the
employees had worked with Allied Steel for ten years, they were ineligible
for any interest in the fund distribution. As a result of this denial of benefits
to the employees, the company was found to be in violation of the Act and
was assessed a $185,000 funding charge. 56
Allied Steel brought suit in the United States District Court seeking de-
claratory and injunctive relief.57 The company claimed that the Act uncon-
stitutionally impaired its contractual obligations with its employees, in that it
required the distribution of pension money to the nine employees. A three-
judge panel rejected the company's claim and upheld the Act as it applied to
Allied Steel.58 Allied Steel then appealed to the United States Supreme
Court which reversed the lower court decision and held the Act to be un-
constitutional.
5 9
ANALYSIS OF MAJORITY OPINION
The Allied Court, by denying the Minnesota legislature the power to
enact pension reform legislation, provided further evidence that the contract
clause was "not a dead letter." 60 The majority acknowledged the impor-
tance of the state police power but emphasized that there must be some
limitation on this power if the contract clause is to remain meaningful. 61
These observations set the tone for the decision and made apparent that the
55. Fleck v. Spannaus, 412 F. Supp. 366, 368 (D. Minn. 1976).
56. 98 S.Ct. at 2717.
57. Allied Steel and the fiduciaries of its pension plan originally brought suit in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois for declaratory and injunctive relief.
The suit was transferred to the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota under
28 U.S.C. § 1404. The District Court of Minnesota held that the Act had not been preempted
by ERISA for the purposes of the suit and issued an order convening a three-judge court. Fleck
v. Spannaus, 412 F. Supp. 366 (D. Minn. 1976).
58. The three-judge court certified several questions to the Minnesota Supreme Court con-
cerning the provisions of the Act and held that the individual plaintiffs, two employees of Allied
Steel and the pension fund trustee lacked standing. In addition, the court appointed a special
master to take evidence and make findings on certain factual matters. Fleck v. Spannaus, 421 F.
Supp. 20 (D. Minn. 1976). Pursuant to the certification order, the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that the Act was applicable to the instant case. Fleck v. Spannaus, Minn. (1977), 251
N.W.2d 334 (1977). The three-judge District Court entered judgment on September 2, 1977,
which it revised on September 21, 1977. Fleck v. Spannaus, 449 F.Supp. 644 (D. Minn. 1977)
(denying the injunction and upholding constitutionality).
59. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1253 and sub-
sequently held the Act unconstitutional as applied to Allied Steel. 98 S.Ct. at 2720.
60. 98 S.Ct. at 2721. See also U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. [ (1977) where the
Court stated: "the Contract Clause was [not] without meaning in modern constitutional juris-
prudence, or that its limitation on state power was illusory." Id. at 16.
61. 98 S.Ct. at 2721.
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Court would continue the trend of carefully examining social and economic
legislation as previously established in United States Trust Co. v. New Jer-
sey. 6 2
The majority began its analysis by examining the severity of the contrac-
tual impairment. The legitimate goal-reasonable means test of Blaisdell was
acknowledged 6 3 but the Court decided to add an additional step to the pro-
cedure, whereby it would make an initial assessment regarding the severity
of the impairment. The Court noted that if the impairment was found to be
minor 64 it, accordingly, would defer to the judgment of the legislature. If,
however, the impairment was determined to be severe, it would then en-
gage in a "careful examination of the nature and purpose of the legisla-
tion. "6 5 The majority found that the pension legislation was a severe impairment
of the contractual obligations. 66 This determination was based on two considera-
tions. First, the impairment was found to be unanticipated, and second, it was
retroactive.
The Court concluded that Allied Steel's expectations were severely altered
because the company was forced to make an unanticipated recalculation of
contributions over the past ten years in order to satisfy the Act's require-
ments. 67 In its brief, Allied Steel argued that its contributions to the pen-
sion plan were determined by actuarial computation and that these tables
took into account such factors as the probable number of employees who
would never receive benefits. Thus, to force it to distribute benefits which
neither the employees nor the company had anticipated would create a se-
vere impairment of contractual obligations.6"
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan refuted this point stating that
the majority overlooked the fact that, irrespective of what Allied Steel may
or may not have anticipated, in order to be effective the plan should have
been adequately funded at all times. 69 Therefore, while the actual recalcu-
62. See notes 44-46 and accompanying text, supra.
63. 98 S.Ct. at 2722.
64. The Court emphatically stated: "There can be no question of the impact of the Min-
nesota Private Pensions Benefits Act upon the company's contractual relationships with its
employees. The Act substantially altered these relationships by superimposing pension obliga-
tions upon the company conspicuously beyond those that it had agreed to undertake." Id. at
2720. The effect of the Act on Allied Steel's contract was to compel the company, upon its
closing, to pay for all employees who had worked for ten or more years with the company.
Previously, Allied Steel had to pay only for those employees with vested rights under the
pension plan. Under the plan's age and year formula, the only employees who had worked for
ten years and had vested rights were those who were sixty-five years of age. See note 49 supra.
This represented a change in the number of people who would qualify under the Act which did
not use age as a factor.
65. 98 S.Ct. at 2723.
66. Id. at 2723.
67. Id.
68. Fleck v. Spannaus, 449 F. Supp. 644 (D. Minn. 1977).
69. 98 S.Ct. at 2727.
1979]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
lation may have been unanticipated, the resulting amount should not have
been. Nor should there have been any large discrepancy between the
amount to be paid and the amount in the fund because the company should
have been contributing sufficient funds each year to create a reserve for
future payments. 70  This argument may be unrealistic, however, because a
plant closing may be unanticipated by both the employees and the company.
Thus, the company's actuarial computations of the fund's prospective needs
would not necessarily account for such a closing. Furthermore, the express
terms of the plan conditioned the distribution of benefits upon the availabil-
ity of the money at the time of the closing 7' and not upon the amount which
should have been in the fund in the first place.
The second reason for the majority's finding that the impairment was se-
vere was that the Act's requirements were retroactive in an area vital to the
contract. 72  Retroactivity was found because the Act imposed the legal duty
of paying benefits, a central element of the contract, for employees who had
worked for Allied Steel prior to its passage. In making this determination, El
Paso v. Simmons was correctly distinguished. 73 The Court in El Paso held
that the controversial legislation, which limited a previously unlimited time
for redemption of reclaimed land, did not affect a matter that induced the
parties to enter into a contract. 74  As the parties did not consent to the
terms of the contract based on the redemption possibilities, their expecta-
tions under the contract were not impaired and, thus, the legislation was
found to be valid. In the instant case, the company's obligation to provide
benefits to its employees under the terms of the contract was central to the
agreement. Since the legislation affected the essence of the contract, the
majority correctly determined that the retroactive effect of the Act was a
substantial impairment.
There has been, however, a long-standing debate over the problem of
retroactive legislation. 75 While retroactive statutes have never been favored
70. See also Fleck v. Spannaus, 449 F. Supp. 644 (D. Minn. 1977). This court concurred
with the opinion that Allied Steel could not be expected to anticipate the possibility of vesting
at an earlier date but "while the date of payment could not be anticipated, the likelihood of
payment was, as was the need, to accumulate a reserve for that purpose." Id. at 649.
71. See note 51 supra. It is common practice for business to use actuarial computations to
determine their employees' future pension needs. See generally Bernstein, Employee Pension
Rights When Plants Shut Down: Problems and Some Proposals, 76 HARv. L. REV. 952 (1963).
72. Statutes with retroactive effects are those which impose new legal duties and rights
upon transactions completed prior to the passage of the statute. See Hochman, The Supreme
Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARv. L. REV. 692 (1960).
73. 98 S.Ct. at 2722 n.14.
74. 379 U.S. 497, 514 (1965). The Court noted that the promise of reinstatement was not
the main reason for the appellee-buyer's undertaking. Instead, the transfer of land was the
primary consideration for which the buyer had to pay a purchase price. When the appellee-
buyer breached his obligation to pay, the land reverted to the state and a right of reinstatement
arose conditioned upon the state's disposal of the land. Id. See note 40 and accompanying text
supra.
75. See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976), in which the Court upheld
legislation that imposed liability on coal mine operators for all miners who contracted
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by the Court, not all such legislation has been found to be unconstitutional.
The statutes found to be constitutional were those deemed to be reasonable
because their adverse effects were outweighed by the need for the legisla-
tion. 76  Therefore, since it is necessary to examine legislation with retroac-
tive effects for reasonableness, the Allied majority found support for its strict
review of the statute.
A determination that the contractual impairment to Allied Steel's contract
was severe, would not, in and of itself, be sufficient to find the Minnesota
legislation unconstitutional. 77  Hence, the Court directed its attention to the
reasonableness standard, the traditional means of determining the constitu-
tionality of legislation which impairs contractual rights. 78 The majority
applied the legitimate goal-reasonable means test of Blaisdell and United
States v. New Jersey. First, it determined the necessity and reasonableness
of the statute by examining two factors: emergency conditions and the scope
of the legislation. Secondly, it evaluated the legitimacy of the statute's goal
by examining the societal interest furthered by the legislation.
The emergency standard enunciated in Blaisdell 79 held that under existing
emergency circumstances, a state may take the appropriate action to protect
its citizens' welfare even though such action might impair contractual obliga-
tions. Since there were no economic emergencies at the time the Act was
passed, the majority concluded that the legislation did not qualify under this
standard.80 Emergencies, however, are not the only element that can jus-
tify state legislation. Although the Blaisdell Court emphasized the
emergency nature of the Minnesota Moratorium law as a reason for its valid-
ity, it did acknowledge that "lelmergency does not increase granted power
or remove or diminish the restrictions imposed on power granted or re-
served."8 1  The majority in Allied also recognized that the lack of an
pneumoconiosis, including those miners who had left their job before the amendment was
passed. Although the case was decided on a 14th amendment due process basis, the Allied
dissent noted its similarity to contract clause case law. See also Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson,
325 U.S. 304 (1945); League v. Texas, 184 U.S. 156 (1902); Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested
Rights, 6 TEX. L. REV. 409 (1928).
76. See generally Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) (the court used a three pronged
test o determine if retroactive legislation could stand); FHA v. Darlington, 358 U.S. 84 (1958);
Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948).
77. 98 S.Ct. at 2723. The Court stated that such a finding would push the inquiry to a
careful examination, not a conclusion.
78. See notes 30-35 and accompanying text supra.
79. 290 U.S. 398, 444 (1934).
80. 98 S.Ct. at 2725.
81. 290 U.S. 398, 425 (1934). Blaisdell emphasized the fact that the issue of legislative
interference with contracts should be based on the overall reasonableness of the legislation and
that all variables surrounding the enactment of the legislation should be examined. An
emergency is one variable that can justify the legislation, but it is not the only variable with
such powers. Id. at 426. This furthered the Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251 (1932) decision
in which the Court found a highway control act to be reasonable because it was passed to
safeguard the interests of the citizens. The Court, therein, stated it does not "matter that the
legislation has the result of modifying or abrogating contracts already in effect." Id. at 276. See
1979]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
emergency alone was insufficient to deny validity to the Act.8 2 It appears
that the emergency standard was raised simply to demonstrate that the Act
did not have the attributes of laws which previously were upheld.
In searching for other constitutional weaknesses, the Court found the
legislation to be narrow in scope because it applied to so few people. This
claim was substantiated by the majority's belief that the Act applied only to
Minnesota employers with one hundred or more employees who terminated
their plans or operations.8 3 The Court opined that the legislation could not
be considered a reasonable solution to a broad societal problem when its
scope was so limited.
In discussing this issue, the majority seemed to disregard the number of em-
ployees who would actually benefit from the legislation and instead focused on
the number of employers it would affect. The Act was not designed, however,
with the intent of benefitting the employers; it was designed to protect the
employees.8 4  Thus, this societal interest in protecting the employees seems
to have been overlooked by the majority. Furthermore, the Act would indi-
rectly protect taxpayers. 85 If pension rights were not guaranteed, many in-
dividuals could be left with little money in their later years, and taxpayers
would have to provide some type of economic support to those denied pen-
sion benefits. Thus, there were more people protected by the Act than the
majority had calculated. More importantly, it has been well established that
a state need not address every aspect of a general welfare problem which it
is attempting to remedy.8 6 Since pension reform is a multifaceted and complex
area, the legislature should not have been expected to solve every pension
also East New York Savings Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230 (1945) (legislation passed during a
temporary economic emergency was found constitutional despite contractual impairment but the
Court held that the emergencies are not necessary to make such a finding); Veix v. Sixth Ward
Building & Loan Ass'n, 310 U. S. 32 (1940) (upheld legislation which impaired contractual obligations,
despite the lack of an emergency situation).
82. 98 S.Ct. at 2725 n.4.
83. Id. at 2725. The appellant's brief went into detailed analysis of this point emphasizing
the fact that Minnesota is an agricultural state where but a minority of the public enjoys private
pension benefits.
84. The very name of the legislation suggests this. Furthermore, the sections are designed
to deal with aspects of employee pension rights. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 181B.04-181B.07
(1974).
85. Congress recognized this problem in a hearing that led to the enactment of the
Employee's Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-108i (1974): "One of the most
important matters of public policy facing the nation today is how to assure that individuals who
have spent their careers in useful and socially productive work will have adequate incomes to
meet their needs when they retire." S. REP. No. 383, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); [1974] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 935, 939.
86. See Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) where the Court declared
that "[iut is [not a] requirement ... that all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at
all." Id. at 110.
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problem at one time.8 7 It has been recognized that when judicial or legislative
resolution can "strike at the evil where it is most felt" a great deal can then be
accomplished.88
One major goal of the Act was a guarantee, for all employees, of vested
rights in pension funds after fewer working years than were generally re-
quired by most pension contracts. Assuring employees of future income is a
major area for pension reform. Yet, the majority seemingly disregarded this
important facet of the Act when it concerned itself with extrinsic but related
matters. 89 The scope of the legislation and the existence of emergency cir-
cumstances are important but the Court's primary focus should have been on
the stated purpose of the legislation. Instead, the majority made very few
references to the inherent value of the Act.90 The Court's emphasis on the
collateral effects of the legislation failed to give the state's interest enough
importance.
To determine the legitimacy of the state's goals to be achieved through
the enactment of the Act, the majority examined the societal interest in the
legislation. The test for determining the legitimacy of this goal is often
whether or not the legislation is designed for the general populace. In the
instant case, the majority decided that the Act did not meet this standard
because it felt that few people would benefit from it. 9 ' Moreover, the
Court gave but a cursory glance to the actual legislative intent and noted
that the state failed to come forward with any proof that the statute was
necessary and reasonable.
A final argument raised in Justice Brennan's dissent was that the impair-
ment of Allied Steel's contract was not prohibited by the contract clause.
Justice Brennan noted that the contract clause had historically been applied
to cases involving the dilution or abrogation of contractual obligations. 92 In
the present case a duty was added to Allied Steel's obligations since the
statute now required that Allied Steel provide employees, previously ineligi-
ble under the plan, with pension benefits. This was not a dilution of a con-
87. Pension benefits can be analogized to unemployment benefits as they are both directed
towards the same good of aiding employees. In Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., 301 U.S. 495
(1937), the Court upheld unemployment legislation despite Due Process objections. The legisla-
tion was found to be valid because it helped to support the needy. Id. 515-16. The Court
recognized that unemployment is a large problem and in establishing a system of benefits, the
"legislature is not bound to occupy the whole field." Id. at 519-20.
88. Id. at 519-20.
89. This was the same argument raised by the dissenting opinion in U.S. Trust v. New
Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977). The dissenters in that case argued that the majority failed to confront
the facts because they never took issue with the state's defense of the repeal. The state ac-
counted for its transportation problems and needs for the disputed legislation.
90. The majority made few references to the purpose of the Act. It gave a brief statement of
the Act in its discussion of the facts but only to show its effect on the Allied Steel contract,
rather than a demonstration of its possible importance. 98 S.Ct. at 2720. Another fleeting refer-
ence to the purpose was made when the majority gave a cursory glance to the district court's
interpretation of the intent. Id. at 2724.
91. See note 84 and accompanying text supra.
92. 98 S.Ct. at 2726.
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tractual obligation, the dissent argued and, therefore, the contract clause did
not apply. 93 This argument, however, may be refuted by examining the
definition of "impairment of obligation." 94 The Court has held that any law
which "enlarges, abridges or in any manner changes this intention" impairs
the contractual obligation. 95 Thus, the Court was justified for its use of the
contract clause because the addition of an obligation to pay for, employees
previously not covered may be construed to be an "enlargement" of the
contract.
IMPACT ON FUTURE LEGISLATION
The effect of the Allied decision is to limit a state's power to enact legisla-
tion despite its intended benefit to society. Previously, the courts had sup-
ported social and economic legislation designed to promote general welfare
despite any resulting impairment of contractual obligations. Allied, nonethe-
less, represents a possible change in the Court's attitude toward the contract
clause. After United States Trust and Allied, it appears that the contract
clause may be given a position of more importance as a protection of indi-
vidual freedom from state interference.
It appears that the Allied majority has extended the stringent standard of
review established in United States Trust 96 to private contracts. United States
Trust distinguished between public and private contracts and held that pub-
lic contracts require closer examination than private ones. Allied has elimi-
nated this distinction and it now seems that all state legislation deemed to
cause a severe impairment of contract obligations will be subject to this
stringent standard of review.
This departure from judicial deference to state legislation and the in-
creased respect for the individual's contractual rights may affect all social and
economic legislation. The decision places a new burden on the state to
explicitly demonstrate the purported validity of its legislative actions.
The Court has demonstrated that it will look for a statement of pur-
pose 97 for the state legislation and will not automatically assume its impor-
tance. The inherent value of the legislation, therefore, will not be sufficient;
it must be clearly articulated by the state in order to withstand a contract
clause challenge.
93. See, e.g., Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380 (1829) which upheld state legis-
lation that enlargened a contract. This case involved a contract between a landlord and a tenant
which was found to be invalid by the state Supreme Court. The legislature subsequently passed
an act which rendered the contract valid. The Supreme Court of the United States held that the
legislation was constitutional and did not impair the obligations of the contract, it just reinstated
them.
94. As Justice Johnson aptly noted in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810),
"where to draw the line, or how to define or limit the words 'obligation of contracts,' will be
found a subject of extreme difficulty." Id. at 143.
95. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 256 (1827).
96. See note 45 and accompanying text supra.
97. 98 S.Ct. at 2724.
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PENSION REFORM AS A LEGITIMATE STATE INTEREST
A final effect of Allied was to deny a state the right to legislate in an area
that it believed to be vital to its citizens' welfare. A state undoubtedly has an
interest in protecting the pension rights of the people working within its
borders. The history of pension plans has shown a rapid development in the
importance of these plans to our society. 98 Originally, pensions were
considered to be a gratuity, arising often from a feeling of moral obligation.9 9
Today, however, pensions play an indispensable role in our society not only
as a source of income to many retired workers but also as a source of capital
to be used for reinvestment in the economy. This importance was over-
looked by the Allied majority when it made its determination.
The major purpose of pension plans is to provide a source of income for
the elderly. 1 ° ° The retired man or woman oftentimes requires support
through funds other than his or her own earnings. A logical way to achieve
this support is through a pension.I10 Although a private pension plan does
not always provide sufficient income for the retired person, it certainly aug-
ments any other income they may receive. 10 2 The need for legal enforce-
ment of pension plans is manifested by the fact that few people ever receive
their expected benefits.' 0 3 American taxpayers already support retirees with
98. See generally W. GREENBOUGH & D. KING PENSION PLANS AND PUBLIC POLICY 28-30
(1976); Coleman & Herlands, Private Pension Plans: The Prospects for Reform, 5 COLUM.
HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 465, 466 (1973).
99. D. MCGILL, SOCIAL SECURITY AND PRIVATE PENSION PLANS 14 (1977).
100. See W. GREENBOUGH & D. KING, PENSION PLANS AND PUBLIC POLICY 3 (1976); R.
TAGGART, THE LABOR MARKET IMPACTS OF THE PRIVATE RETIREMENT SYSTEM 3 (1973) [here-
inafter cited as TAGGART]. See also Fox, Work Status and Income Change 1968-72. Retirement
History Study Preview, 39 SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN No. 12, 15 (1976); Thompson, Cover-
age and Benefits, 1972; Findings From the Retirement History Study, 101 MONTHLY LABOR
REVIEW No. 11 3 (1978).
101. See Preminger, Jennings & Alexander, What Do You Get With The Gold Watch? An
Analysis of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 17 ARIZ. L. REV. 426, 426
(1975).
102. Income is one of the major problems of the elderly. It has been noted that social se-
curity is available to most of the elderly population but those benefits are rarely sufficient to
cover the cost of living. See, e.g., R. NADER & K. BLACKWELL, YOU AND YOUR PENSION 13
(1973). The assurance of a pension income not only provides financial stability but also a sense
of relief to the individual and a benefit to society. The Chicago Tribune recently printed a series
of articles entitled "Growing Old in America" which discussed the problems of income for the
elderly. Chicago Tribune, October 3, 1978, § 1 at 1. The author's emphasis was on social
security and its insufficient funding but he noted that private pension plans have helped many.
The problem is that over half of the work force still has no private pension coverage.
103. Statistics show that only four to eight percent of all participants in domestic plans have
received benefits since 1950. Coleman & Herlands, Private Pension Plans: The Prospects for
Reform, 5 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 465 (1973). Such statistics and problems led to the
enactment of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§
1001-1081 (1974). ERISA guaranteed vesting and funding requirements, termination insurance
and rules about fiduciary responsibility. Commentators have noted, however, that ERISA did
not solve all the problems; in fact, it increased the cost of providing pension benefits. This, in
turn, can lead to layoffs or termination of a plan. Therefore, a need for reform to guarantee
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an annual tax subsidy.10 4  If few people receive their expected funds, the
taxpayers will ultimately pay more to other sources of government aid programs
to support those who never receive their expected income. 10 5 If private
pensions were legislatively and judicially regulated, this burden on the public
could be averted.
Furthermore, private pension funds are very important because of their
effect on retirees and the capital market. 10 6  This effect is due, primarily, to
the substantial amount of money in the funds 107 and the various uses for
that money. For example, the increase in net savings through pension funds,
has greatly supplemented the personal savings of thousands of workers.' 08
It must also be noted that tax benefits can arise for the employer, because it
may take a deduction for contributions to a trust, set up for employee pension
benefits. 10 9 Thus, pension finds can play a vital role in the present and
future economic status of both employees and employers.
Moreover, the accumulated capital is often used to generate new capital
through investment and, as a result, workers have acquired substantial
equity in many types of corporate stocks and government bonds. 110 This
implies that the funds possibly could be used to gain control of private cor-
porations. 111 Therefore, the pension reserves are important and could be
employed to create new capital not only for the retired employees but also
for the national economy.
pension rights still exists. N. TURE, THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE PENSION PLANS 8 (1976) [here-
inafter cited as TURE].
104. R. NADER & K. BLACKWELL, YOU AND YOUR PENSION 3 (1973).
105. Statistics indicate that the percentage of people over 65 years of age is steadily increas-
ing: in 1900, there were 3 million people over the age of 65 (four percent of the population), in
1950 there were 12% million people over the age of 65 (eight and one half percent of the
population), by the year 2000 it has been predicted that there will be 26 million people over the
age of 65 (approximately 11 percent of the population). As the percentage of people over 65 has
increased, the percentage of those still working has decreased: in 1890, 39.9 percent of those
over 65 held jobs; by 1950, only 23 percent of those over 65 were still in the labor market.
SYMPOSIUM, PRIVATE PENSION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 2 (1970). These statistics imply that
there will be more people without jobs in the future. The state does have an interest in provid-
ing for these people through pension reform legislation.
106. See S. REP. No. 127, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1973); Daniels v. Inter. Brotherhood of
Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223, 1237 (7th Cir. 1977).
107. In 1976, over 160 billion dollars were credited to private pension funds. STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 332 (1977). It has been predicted that by 1980, pension
funds will have a total reserve of 200 billion dollars. TAGGART, supra note 101, at 69. Further-
more, these vast reserves are not depleted by large amounts every year in payments. For
example, in 1975 the total assets credited to private pensions were 145 billion dollars. Of that
amount, only 12 billion was disbursed. Id. Thus, a substantial amount remains in these funds,
which, in turn, can and does affect the economy.
108. In a study of the breakdown of individuals' savings, it was shown that in 1960, 9.3
billions of all dollars saved came from pension reserves. By 1976, that figure had risen to 24.7
billion dollars. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 439 (1977). See also TUBE,
supra note 104, at 2.
109. 26 U.S.C. § 401 (1976).
110. TUBE, supra note 103, at 2.
111. TAGGART, supra note 100, at 69.
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It cannot be denied that pension reform is important to society. It in-
volves a substantial amount of capital and it affects the lives of every worker.
Thus, there is a definite need for regulations such as the Private Pension
Benefits Protection Act." 2  Without such regulation, the funds may be mis-
used and employees who depend on their pension rights could be divested
of their expected benefits. 113  Requirements that guarantee the employee
pension rights, as does the Act, become very important because they guaran-
tee the employee a share of the benefits. Guaranteed vested helps to
eliminate the possibility that a worker may lose those benefits because he was
laid off for one day or the company closed its operations: "[F]rom the
standpoint of the whole system of social economy, no employer has the right
to engage men in any occupation that exhausts the individual's industrial life
... and then leaves the remnant floating on society at large as a derelict at
sea." 114 Furthermore, through legislation such as the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, 115 the Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act 1 16 and the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act. 117 Congress has recognized the
vital need for pensions and their regulation. If the courts are not willing to
support the state pension reform legislation, many people who depend on
retirement benefits will ultimately suffer. Therefore, it is time for the courts
to acknowledge the need for pension reform and the inherent reasonableness
of such legislation.
CONCLUSION
Although the Private Pension Benefits Protection Act has been preempted
by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,118 the impor-
tance of the Allied decision has not been diminished. The Court's denial of a
state's power to enact legislation which it considers to be vital for general
112. In a recent district court case concerning pension funds and security regulations, the
court recognized the need to have the S.E.C. regulate pension plans. Daniels v. Inter.
Brotherhood of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977). If pension plans are important
enough to be regulated by the S.E.C., it seems logical that they are important enough for state
regulation. The Daniels decision was reversed in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
Daniels, 47 U.S.L.W. 4135 (1979). This decision, however, did not declare pension plans to be
unimportant; in fact, it did not address this issue. Instead, the Court held that pension plans
did not qualify as a security and that ERISA gave sufficient protection to the plans.
113. 98 S.Ct. 2727. See generally Who Owns Pension Funds? Chicago Tribune, Sept. 25,
1978, § 5 at 10 (an article discussing the management and control of pension funds).
114. L. SQUIRES, OLD AGE DEPENDENCY IN THE U.S. 272 (1912).
115. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1976).
116. Id. 9 301-309.
117. Id. 9 1001-1081 (1974).
118. The Minnesota Pension Benefits Act has been pre-empted by the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974. 29 U.S.C. § 1001-1081 (1974) (ERISA). ERISA signifies Congres-
sional awareness of the importance of private pensions and their impact on general welfare. The
purpose of ERISA is to guarantee minimum standards, including early vesting to all employees
who work for private companies. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1061 (1974). Moreover, because the con-
tract clause applies only to state law, ERISA is exempt from its restrictions. See note I supra.
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welfare and the affirmance of the individual's right to contract without state
interference represents a shift in the emphasis of contract clause interpreta-
tion.
Since its inception, there has been no per se rule of application for the
contract clause. There has never been a category of contracts that has been
innately free from state legislation. Instead, the Court has established
guidelines, contingent on the reasonableness of the legislation, for the appli-
cation of the clause. The United States Trust case had emphasized a dual
standard of analysis using a more stringent standard of review for laws which
affected contracts in which the state is a party than for laws interfering with
contracts between private individuals. Allied also enunciated a dual standard
of review but did not make the same distinction. Instead, Allied's standard is
based on the severity of impairment, with the stringent standard of review
to be applied to laws which severely impair contractual obligations rather
than to those which have a minimal effect. The Court, however, neglected to
offer any guidelines for this determination of severity, apparently leaving the
issue to judicial discretion. If this is so, the judiciary may have too signifi-
cant a role in determining the validity of legislation because it will ultimately
decide if the legislation impairs an obligation of a contract to such an extent
that the statute must fail.
Two years ago, Justice Brennan wrote in his dissent in United States
Trust, "[g]iven that this is the first case in some 40 years in which this Court
has seen fit to invalidate purely economic and social legislation on the
strength of the contract clause, one may hope that it will prove a rare
phenomenon.... "119 Allied proved, however, that the Court's new respect
for the contract clause may not be rare. Instead, it continued the trend of
subordinating police power legislation to contractual obligations. It now ap-
pears that the contract clause will once again be employed as a protection of
individual contractual rights, possibly to the detriment of the state's ability
to pass legislation for the benefit of the general welfare.
Carlen A. Petersen
119. 431 U.S. 1, 60 (1977).
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